Dr. Amir Hooshang Mirkooshesh – Editor-in-Chief of the Iranian Journal of International Relations
Introduction
Iran–Russia relations have always been caught between tactical cooperation and strategic mistrust. Using a descriptive–analytical approach and relying on historical sources, diplomatic records, and contemporary geopolitical evidence, this article examines a series of betrayals, interventions, and hostile actions by Russia against Iran. From the Treaties of Golestan and Turkmenchay and the military occupation of Iran to Russia’s silence in the face of Israeli aggressions during the 2024 and 2025 wars, and its implicit support for the UAE’s claims over the three islands, the evidence suggests that Russia has acted more as an opportunistic player than a strategic partner.
Since the 19th century, Iran–Russia relations have fluctuated between mistrust, intervention, and power rivalry. Contrary to the belief of some elites in forming an anti-Western alliance with Russia, historical evidence and contemporary positions indicate that—whether under the Tsarist Empire, the Soviet Union, or the current Russian Federation—Russia has consistently pursued a unilateral, self-serving policy toward Iran. By examining historical and behavioral examples, this article provides a comprehensive and critical picture of the nature of these relations. In conclusion, it stresses the need to reconsider Iran’s foreign policy toward Russia, emphasizing independence and balance in international relations.
1. Historical Betrayals and Aggressions by Russia Against Iran
The First and Second Russo–Persian Wars were fought with the aim of Russian expansion in the Caucasus. Despite Iran’s declared neutrality during World Wars I and II, Russia occupied northern Iran. Exploiting the weakness of the Qajar government and its inability to modernize the army, Russia imposed two heavy and unequal wars on Iran.
In the First War (1804–1813), after occupying parts of the Caucasus, Russia forced Iran to accept the Treaty of Golestan, which resulted in the loss of territories such as Georgia, Dagestan, and parts of Armenia. In the Second War (1826–1828), Russia once again invaded, compelling Iran to sign the humiliating Treaty of Turkmenchay. This treaty not only led to the cession of Eastern Armenia, Nakhchivan, and other regions of the South Caucasus, but also imposed colonial privileges such as extraterritorial rights (capitulations) and the payment of heavy reparations.
After World War II, Soviet forces refused to withdraw from Iranian territory, triggering the Azerbaijan Crisis of 1946, which ended only after U.S. threats forced the Soviets to retreat.
One of the most painful episodes in modern Iran–Russia relations was the massacre of the people of Tabriz by the Tsarist Russian army during the Constitutional Revolution, following the military occupation of the city. This event inflicted a severe blow not only to Iran’s independence and national dignity but also to the humanitarian conscience.
Among the most criminal and unforgettable hostile acts by Russia against the Iranian nation was the shelling of the Holy Shrine of Imam Reza (AS) in Mashhad. This historical tragedy, carried out in 1912 by Tsarist Russian troops, represented the height of disrespect toward religious sanctities, brazen interference in Iran’s internal affairs, and crimes against innocent civilians.
Negative Role in the Nationalization of the Oil Industry (1950s): The Soviet Union outwardly supported the nationalization of oil, but in reality sought to obtain the concession for oil in northern Iran for itself. The Soviet Union’s double-dealing and threatening positions during this period deepened Iran’s mistrust toward the East.
2. Russia’s Non-Transparent and Interventionist Behaviors in the Contemporary Era
Support for Sanctions Against Iran
Between 2006 and 2010, Russia voted in favor of all UN Security Council sanctions against Iran’s nuclear program (Resolutions 1737, 1747, 1803, and 1929), thereby playing a role in Iran’s international isolation.
Delays in the Construction of the Bushehr Power Plant
Despite the initial agreement in the 1990s, Russia delayed the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant until 2010, using it as a diplomatic pressure tool to leverage Iran in negotiations with the West and to gain concessions from the United States and Europe.
Russia’s Role in Syria and the Instrumental Use of Iran — The “Post-Assad” Scenario
The official entry of the Russian military into the Syrian war in September 2015 — ostensibly at the invitation of Bashar al-Assad’s government and for the fight against terrorism — in practice shifted the balance of power in Syria in Russia’s favor. Before this, Iran was the primary actor on the ground supporting Damascus. With Russia’s intervention, Iran was relegated to a secondary role, losing both military and political initiative.
Russia gradually either took over or sidelined Iran’s infrastructural, military, and security projects in Syria. On certain occasions, Russian military commanders blocked the transfer of Iranian equipment or prevented IRGC attacks on opposition positions. Open competition in Latakia Port, Damascus Airport, and the Syrian army’s security structure demonstrated Russia’s efforts to reduce Iran’s on-the-ground presence.
In the Syrian reconstruction process, major contracts were awarded to Russia, China, and the UAE, while Iranian companies were either excluded or relegated to low-level participation. In recent years — especially after the Astana talks and behind-the-scenes negotiations with Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the United States — Russian analysts and diplomats have spoken of the need for a smooth transfer of power in Syria. Many Russian elites have portrayed Bashar al-Assad as a spent force and a source of instability.
While outwardly cooperating with Iran in Syria against the West and terrorism, Russia has, in practice, been managing a transition away from Assad, gradually eroding Iran’s influence, and establishing a security order favorable to itself in partnership with Arab actors and Israel. This demonstrates that even in the most important geopolitical case for Iran in the past two decades, Russia has not been a reliable partner, prioritizing its own interests instead.
Sales of Russian Weapons to Iran
Russia’s behavior in arms sales and defense systems to Iran is not only inconsistent with the so-called “strategic” relationship but also reveals the Kremlin’s instrumental and often condescending view of Iran. In practice, Russia does not treat Iran as a priority and, whenever facing diplomatic or financial pressures, sacrifices arms relations with Iran for its larger considerations involving the West, Israel, or Arab states.
Ten-Year Delay in Delivering the S-300 System
In 2007, Iran signed a contract with Russia to purchase the S-300 air defense system. However, under U.S. pressure and following the adoption of UNSC Resolution 1929, Russia unilaterally canceled the contract in 2010. This was a clear breach of the agreement and a unilateral humiliation for Iran. While Iran fully honored its financial commitments, Russia delayed delivery without regard for Iran’s defense needs.
After the JCPOA and the lifting of UN resolutions, Russia delivered the system in 2016. According to some reports, the delivered version was an export model of the S-300, lower than the original contracted version, and lacked effective capability against fifth-generation fighter jets and ballistic missiles.
Refusal to Sell More Advanced Systems
Despite Iran’s formal requests, Russia has refused to sell its S-400 defense system. In the case of fighter aircraft, although the official purchase of Su-35 jets was announced in 2022, Russia has not delivered any aircraft to Iran as of 2025. Some reports even suggest that the planes were diverted to Egypt or other countries.
When compared with Russia’s arms dealings with other allied countries, such as Turkey, India, China, and even Saudi Arabia, the disparity is striking: those countries have received advanced systems like the S-400, Su-35s, and sophisticated missiles. In contrast, Iran — despite political and military cooperation — has consistently remained at the lowest level of arms interaction.
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4. The Iran–Israel Wars of 2024 and 2025 and Russia’s Passive Stance
The Iran–Israel war of 2024 was a historic turning point, demonstrating that deterrence equations in the region had entered a new phase. At the same time, this war revealed that Iran stands alone on the international stage and that no global power — not even Russia — would defend it in the event of an attack. This development could mark the beginning of a fundamental reassessment of Iran’s foreign policy.
In response to Israel’s attack on the Iranian consulate in Damascus, Iran, for the first time, directly targeted Israeli territory. Israel, supported by the West, struck bases in Iran (including near Isfahan). Despite this blatant violation of Iran’s sovereignty, Russia merely called on both sides to exercise restraint and refrained from condemning Israel.
The 12-day war between Iran and Israel was the most intense and prolonged direct clash between these two regional powers. Following tensions and conflicts throughout 2024 — including months of cyber warfare, assassinations, and proxy wars — it escalated into a limited yet extremely costly confrontation that brought the region to the brink of a full-scale war. Russia’s only response was an official statement calling for “restraint,” without any mention of Israel’s aggression, thereby maintaining its artificial neutrality.
