Zahra Sharifzadeh, Member of the Editorial Board of the Iranian Journal of International Relations

While China's foreign policy has traditionally relied on economic leverage and "soft power" diplomacy as its main tools for projecting influence, Beijing is actively using concepts related to strategic information operations as a means to directly affect processes and outcomes in strategic arenas of competition. In other words, the People's Republic of China (PRC) seeks to reclaim its rightful place in the world, but obstacles, particularly the United States' activities in the Pacific, including its support for Taiwan, stand in the way. The U.S. National Defense Strategy of 2018 emphasizes that the "fundamental" challenge to U.S. security is the "re-emergence of long-term, strategic competition" by "revisionist powers," namely the Russian Federation and the PRC. Moreover, this competition spans "all dimensions of power," with Moscow and Beijing engaging in short-term efforts of armed conflict through extending coercion to new fronts, violating principles of sovereignty, exploiting ambiguities, and deliberately blurring the lines between military and non-military objectives. A prominent front in this competition is "information warfare." Thus, the question arises: What strategy has China adopted to counter the United States?

To answer this research question, a qualitative analytical method was employed, using books and documents as data collection tools. Considering multiple factors, including China's history, culture, and military philosophy, the Chinese Communist Party's decision-making processes in relation to war have led to the adoption of the "Three Warfares" strategy as China's information warfare strategy against the United States.

The period between 1839 and 1949, known in China as the "Century of Humiliation," was marked by unjust wars, unequal treaties, and significant territorial losses, including the loss of Hong Kong and Taiwan, as well as independence movements in Tibet, Mongolia, and Xinjiang. Although the PRC has regained control over Tibet, Inner Mongolia, and Xinjiang, its control over Taiwan remains largely hindered by U.S. military support for Taiwan, posing a major obstacle to the PRC's aspirations for reunification. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) seeks to influence the outside world, especially the United States, for two main reasons. First, to maintain the Party's power, as many threats to the Party and its political system occur in the realm of ideas, which cannot be defeated by traditional tools. The importance of national security law for sustainable economic and social development, along with other core national interests, and the ability to ensure the continuity of the security situation, were emphasized in a 2015 law. Second, the Party's leaders believe that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) is too weak to protect the Party-state alone, as the PLA spends considerable energy assessing its capabilities against its goals and rivals, leading to a realization in 2006 by the Central Military Commission that China's military capabilities were "incompatible with winning local information wars" and accomplishing the "new historic missions" set by then-President Hu Jintao, which included supporting the Party's political power.

Since the Gulf War, PLA analysts have emphasized the "integration of peacetime and wartime," increasingly associating victory in war, or at least the achievement of political objectives, with peacetime preparedness. Success requires shaping the perceptions of governments and their populations, as well as the Chinese people, regarding war. Information operations need to encompass both external and internal dimensions. Consequently, the PLA employs the "Three Warfares" strategy to shape perceptions and control issues by using legal tools to gain an advantage over its adversaries.

In 2003, the Central Military Commission approved the conceptual umbrella of the "Three Warfares" as a guide for PLA information operations. This concept is based on three reinforcing strategies: the coordinated use of strategic psychological operations, overt and covert media manipulation, and legal warfare designed to manipulate strategies, defense policies, and perceptions of target audiences abroad. At the operational level, the "Three Warfares" falls under the responsibility of the General Political Department's Liaison Office, which conducts various political, financial, military, and informational operations through four bureaus: (1) a liaison office responsible for covert operations focused on Taiwan; (2) an investigation and research office responsible for international security analysis and friendly contacts; (3) a foreign propaganda office responsible for psychological operations, the development of propaganda themes, and legal analysis; and (4) a border defense office responsible for managing border negotiations and agreements.

Psychological warfare, also known as "mind warfare," involves the use of propaganda and misinformation to influence the attitudes and behaviors of adversaries. The PRC's psychological and legal warfare activities are heavily focused on the South China Sea. China claims ownership of several islands in the region based on historical grounds, ignoring protests from neighboring countries and international court rulings against its claims. The region is rich in untapped oil reserves and serves as a major global trade route. Gaining exclusive control over the South China Sea would greatly assist China in achieving regional and global hegemony.

Initially, the PRC used legal warfare in the South China Sea by appealing to international legal bodies to legitimize its territorial claims. When these bodies rejected its claims, the PRC dismissed them as illegitimate and refused to comply with their findings. This ultimately undermines the legitimacy of these institutions and reduces stability in the region, as neighboring countries become increasingly uncertain about the legal status of the South China Sea. Although the United States has not been directly affected by the PRC's actions, it has incurred costs in the form of increased freedom of navigation operations.

The PRC's psychological warfare activities in the South China Sea are primarily aimed at deterring neighboring countries from encroaching on its claimed territory. When ships and aircraft from neighboring countries enter disputed areas, they face violent resistance from China, including PRC vessels attacking Vietnamese fishing boats, disrupting Malaysian oil exploration activities, and verbally harassing Filipino military pilots via radio. The continuation of such psychological warfare actions has the potential to provide the PRC with space to further expand its artificial islands in the region, leading to greater instability and increased costs for the U.S. and its partners.

Another of China’s actions is unrestricted warfare in psychological operations, as proposed in the book "Unrestricted Warfare" by two Chinese colonels, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, in 1999. They suggest strategies for China to use in potential conflicts with a more powerful adversary like the United States. The authors propose various unconventional methods that China could use in such a conflict, including:

• Cyber Warfare: Using computer attacks to disrupt the enemy’s military and civilian infrastructure, as well as stealing sensitive information.
• Economic Warfare: Using economic tools to weaken the enemy’s economy, such as currency manipulation, trade sanctions, and investment restrictions.
• Psychological Warfare: Using propaganda and other tools to influence enemy public opinion and undermine their morale.
• Terrorism: Using terrorist attacks to create chaos and fear among the enemy’s population.
• Asymmetric Warfare: Using unconventional tactics and weapons to exploit the enemy’s vulnerabilities and avoid their strengths.
• Media Warfare: Involves using traditional and social media to shape public opinion and control the narrative. This can include using state-controlled media to spread propaganda and misinformation, as well as using cyberattacks to disrupt or manipulate information flow.
• State-Controlled Media for Disseminating Propaganda and Misinformation, and Promoting the Government’s Views and Policies:
• Social Media Platforms for Spreading Misinformation and Influencing Public Opinion: For instance, using bots and fake accounts.
• Cyberattacks to Disrupt or Manipulate Information Flow: Such as hacking the websites of news organizations and social media accounts.
• Legal Tools to Restrict or Control Access to Certain Types of Information: This includes censorship and the use of strict laws to control the media.
• Media to Promote a Positive Image of China and Its Government: While downplaying or criticizing other countries and their governments.
• Media to Shape Issues Surrounding China’s Territorial Claims and Disputes in the South China Sea: And challenging the actions of other countries in the region.

Additionally, the People's Republic of China engages in media warfare in various ways to influence American audiences. For example, the censorship actions by the National Basketball Association and software giant Activision-Blizzard are significant. However, the most crucial aspect of China's media warfare is in Hollywood. With over 70,000 cinema screens, China has one of the fastest-growing film markets in the world, making it highly attractive for foreign investment. However, due to legal restrictions, theaters are allowed to show only a limited number of foreign films each year, and only after thorough scrutiny by state censors. This has led to subtle changes in film content over the past decade. As a result, U.S. film studios alter their content to appease the censors of the People’s Republic of China to ensure that their products can be shown in China.

• Legal Warfare: This involves using international laws and legal tools to gain an advantage over adversaries. It can include utilizing legal challenges and diplomatic pressure to achieve strategic goals. Therefore, China has made significant investments in cyber warfare capabilities and also uses economic tools like the Belt and Road Initiative and the Made in China 2025 plan to exert influence. Legal warfare includes using international legal challenges and diplomatic pressure to achieve strategic goals. Some specific examples of legal warfare include:
• International Arbitration and Legal Challenges: To contest territorial claims and disputes in the South China Sea.
• Diplomatic Pressure: To prevent other countries from recognizing Taiwan as an independent state.
• Trade Agreements and Economic Incentives: To gain access to the resources and markets of other countries.
• Legal Tools to Challenge the Actions of Other Countries: Such as China's legal challenges against U.S. tariffs on Chinese goods.
• Legal Tools to Challenge the Actions of International Organizations: Such as China's legal challenges against the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in disputes in the South China Sea.
• Legal Tools to Challenge the Actions of Foreign Companies: Such as China's legal challenges against the actions of foreign companies operating in China.

The People's Republic of China is striving to establish its rightful place in the world and will likely clash with the United States, its main rival for global hegemony. It is currently attempting to "win without fighting" using its "Three Warfare’s" doctrine. Its influence in the entertainment industry, efforts to legitimize its claims in the South China Sea, and continued harassment of U.S. partners and allies in the Pacific are part of a planned set of activities aimed at undermining the resolve of the United States and its allies before a forced reunification with Taiwan. China is prepared to pay the price to achieve its strategic goals at the expense of the United States.

Sources:

• Clarke, Michael (2019), "China’s Application of the ‘Three Warfares’ in the South China Sea and Xinjiang," link, Published for the Foreign Policy Research Institute by Elsevier Ltd, doi: 10.1016/j.orbis.2019.02.007, pp. 1-22.
• IMR Reporter, Indian Military Review (2022), "Three Warfares Strategy," link, pp. 1-6.
• Martin, Major Morgan (2021), "China's Three Information Warfares," link.
• Mattis, Peter (2018), "China’s ‘Three Warfares’ in Perspective," link, pp. 1-11.
• Raska, Michael (2015), "China and the ‘Three Warfares’," link, pp. 1-7.

Footnotes:

• Information Warfare
• Central Military Commission (CMC)
• Qiao Liang
• Wang Xiangsui
• Belt and Road